Endgame
|
Things are more like they are now, then they
ever were.
|
President
Eisenhower
|

I know of dozens of
theories and ideas that seem to “explain” the decline of the Roman
empire. Too much fun, mass-migrations, not enough babies (a genuine
concern of the ancients), a heating technology that was feeding entire
forests into the ingenious hypocausts of public baths and double glazed
housing estates and so created a climate change – now, where have I
heard that before? – bad diet, Christian
Talibans
vandalizing the culture, the missionary position, the frustrations of
an
increasingly totalitarian police state, a revenue system out of
control, new
religions undermining the civic values, a population crash because of
smallpox or because of the lead piping in the water supply or because
of
new innovations like the early days of pewter ware, when the right mix
of the
alloy was still a bit of a mystery.
I, too, have sinned, and
proposed to
reevaluate the founding of Constantinople. As the ultimate white
elephant in a
bruised economy, Constantinople was sucking the life blood out of the
provinces. To adorn his new capital and feed “the
mouths of Constantine’s creatures with the marrow of
the Empire”,
Constantine’s agents kept scouring the land, dismantled buildings and
pillaged
works of art “so that the provinces shall no longer own it” (Ammianus).
Every pillar, every column still standing in Constantinople was once
stolen
from somewhere else. And when, only 23 years later, all this plunder
burned
down in a fire, an other round of looting took away what had escaped
the first
time. To
feed the new capital the corn supply from Egypt was
redirected and no longer available for Greece and Italy; even Italy’s
grain supply
from Africa came repeatedly under threat. Lately a geologist has
pointed out
the silting of major Mediterranean harbors in the 3rd century which
must have
affected the urban developments of the period.
Interesting facts, but what do
they explain? This is
life. People make a mess of it and then muddle through. The silting
harbors
could no longer support the maritime trade of the 4th century, so the
Romans
built new harbors and the centers of commerce moved on to new places.
Of course some economic
facts are undeniable. When Emperor
Diocletian retired in 305 AD., one pound of gold was worth a
hundred-thousand
denarii. In 472 AD., the same pound of gold was in the market for
2,000,120,000,000 denarii (two
billion and one hundred-twenty million) according to a
calculation by the US treasury. The
military, too, came under scrutiny. The catastrophic defeat in the
battle of
Adrianople on August 9, 378 AD. made a deep impression on the
contemporary
observer, it evoked memories of Canae, but the figures don’t add up.
The
victorious Goths could be assembled in just one wagon train – that is
not more
than 16,000 people tops and includes the women and children – a refugee
camp on
the march. The Roman troops sent against them, were scraped from the
bottom of
the barrel of the Persian border defenses; they lacked coherence in
their
composition. Too many generals, too few fighters. The Roman deployment
still
outnumbered and outflanked the Goths, but the formation was split in
three
columns. The Romans lost coordination and the Gothic chief destroyed
the column
right in front of him while his cavalry effectively screened his
movements. In
the general confusion Emperor Valens and a few guards sought to make a
last
stand in the ruins of an abandoned cottage. Rafters fell from the
burning roof
on the emperor and killed him. Like Custer’s at Little Big Horn it was
an
entirely unnecessary defeat and didn’t really tip the balance of power.
In the decades after the
battle, it took some
ingenuity and nimble footwork for the chief of operations to police
with a
glorified SWAT team of some 5,000 man an area that centuries earlier
had been
protected by thirty heavily armed brigades of professional soldiers,
150,000
man altogether, plus twice as many auxiliaries. But, if nothing else,
the comes
et magister utriusque militiae
Stilicho
demonstrated that it can be done, despite the unceasing squabbling and
back-biting between the various centers of administration in East and
West.
Mind you, that was the period when the “barbarian invasions” were
supposed to
turn everything upside down. We even hear of the recruiting of Arab
tribesmen
for the territorial defences under the walls of Constantinople. The
Arabs were
reliable and proved their value. Who would have thought that one day
the Byzantine
empire would fight for dear survival against these tribesmen’s
grandchildren?
A good approximation for
the actual strength of the invading
tribes and the population figures of the late empire are the census
figures
from the United States of America in the 1880s. The Dakota (Sioux)
nation, when
still considered “intact,” was numbered 48,000 individuals. This
approximates
the total of the Goths with all their allies and families on both sides
of the
border. The total of the US population at the time was somewhere in the
order
of fifty million. A mere five thousand US cavalry policed 150,000
natives.
Rome’s problem, too, was not the numbers. Emperor Julian the Apostate (361 – 363 AD.) campaigned against
Germanic raiders
into France with less than 14,000 troops, of which 10,000 had been
Frankish
conscripts from the neighborhood. For centuries the Frank peasantry and
their
nobles had filtered in westward, most of the time peacefully, and in
the
process had become hardworking and taxpaying Romans. When these people
finally
made their bid for a greater political share in the system historians
suddenly
became hysterical and talked of “Barbarian Invasions.” But Roman
administrators
used to resettle colonies of migrants since the days of the Republic.
Julius
Caesar, the dictator, had built his career on it. So what had changed?
Apparently it was the administration who threw prudence overboard and
became
more and more high handed and arrogant in these matters: “Sueridus
and
Colias, two nobles of the Goths, who had some time before been friendly
received with their people had been sent to Hadrianople to pass the
winter in
that city.
But,
on a sudden, letters arrived from the emperor. They were ordered to
cross over
to the province of the Hellespont. In a very modest manner, they asked
to be
provided with provisions, and to be allowed a respite of two days. But
the
chief magistrate of the city was indignant, being also out of humor
with them
on account of some injury which had been done to property of his in the
suburbs,
and he roused a great mob of the lowest of the people and led them
forth armed
to hasten the departure of the Goths. The Goths stood
without moving. The were bewildered and
alarmed by this unexpected calamity; to them this outbreak of the
citizens,
looked more as if caused by a sudden impulse than by any deliberate
purpose.
And being assailed beyond all endurance by reproaches and
manifestations of ill
will, and also by occasional missiles, they at last broke out into open
revolt” (Ammianus XXXI, 17:3).
The historian witnessed the
events first hand; he
gives us the name of a certain Fritigern as the chief of the Goths. If
we
replace “Fritigern” with “Sitting Bull” the American reader will
suddenly
recognize a familiar pattern. Custer’s last stand was Adrianople all
over
again, a consequence of the same kind of stupidity and inaptitude. On
the other
hand, the U.S. cavalry were all white soldiers except for a hand full
of Indian
scouts. What if the US army had recruited its entire cavalry from the
natives?
Because that’s the impression we get from the Romans.
The supreme commander of
the horses, was General Victor, a
Sarmatian by birth. The most
energetic and competent generals fighting the Goths were of Gothic
stock
themselves. They had enlisted not as hired mercenaries, or “foederati,” but began their
careers as
regular conscripts who had risen through the ranks. Like General
Frigeridus, a
commander “who knew as well how to command as to preserve his troops” (Ammianus). On previous engagements
the Gothic general had prepared for battle
“with great prudence“ and “after the Gothic
chief, the much-dreaded cause of all these
troubles, had been slain, he voluntarily spared the rest and allotted
to them
for cultivation the districts around the Italian towns of Modena,
Reggio, and
Parma” (Ammianus).
Frigeridus’s superior, the Roman chief of staff of all imperial forces,
was the comes et magister utriusque militiae Richomer, a Frank, born
in France. He was an educated man,
well read in the classics and in the Greek literature of his time, an
admirer
of the pagan publicist Libanius (314 – 394 AD.).
Incidentally Richomer provided patronage for an other countryman of
his, a
certain Eugenius, a man of the local aristocracy, also a man of
learning and
culture. When another general of Frankish origin – Arbogast – involved
him in a
coup, Eugenius accepted the purple in August 22, 392 AD. and
immediately went
into negotiations with Richomer’s boss, the emperor Theodosius I. This
failed
and the usurper looked for the backing of his claims by the still pagan
senate
in Rome; he issued edicts of toleration: not to protect Christians from
pagan
persecution – that was a thing of the past – but protecting the
Pagan
population from the harassment by Christian Taliban and Ayatollahs.
This was the opportunity
the chief of the Italian
administration, “Saint” Ambrose of Milan (338 – 397 AD.) had been waiting for.
Ambrose was the Christian equivalent
of Lenin, even in the facial expression, a Bolshevik if ever there was
any. His
cassocked spin-doctors made sure that the ensuing civil war was going
to be
spun as the final showdown between Christians and Pagans.
This was hardly true. The
combatants and civil servants in
both camps were mainly Christians; although within the spectrum of
Christian
churches in the empire, the Catholics were still the minority. Emperor
Theodosius issued mobilization orders and the hostilities commenced.
The
decisive encounter at the Frigidus in 384 AD. terminated Eugenius’
brief bid
for power and his severed head was planted on the point of a pike. It
also kind
of terminated the ambitions of the Frankish faction among the tribal
players in
the Roman army; at least for a while. So the Frankish nobles turned
their
energies to more domestic objectives and the provinces in France inched
closer
to complete autonomy; it became more and more difficult to move
enlistments
away from their home territories: "The count moved forwards from
France, bringing with him some cohorts, which were cohorts in name
only. The
greater portion of them had already deserted for fear, that France, now
divested of all the troops, would be open to ravage by unchecked
raiding
parties crossing the Rhine. So Richomer returned to France, to convey
reinforcements" (Ammianus).
A revealing observation:
the Roman army was not an army of
mercenaries; the Roman soldier enlisted as a conscript and if found
able bodied
was permitted to sign up for professional service over a given period
of time,
with the prospect of a sizeable reward at his discharge.
In the first centuries of
the imperial army, the soldier was
prohibited from marrying during the period of his enlistment and we
don’t hear
of any difficulties of moving legions to distant places far from their
home
base. From the second half of the 3rd century onward the tight ruling
on
marriages in the army was beginning to be amended and relaxed. As a
result the
local levies became more territorial and a conscript was rather
hesitant to
sign up to a service far away from his family. Orders are orders, but
the
commanders had not always the authority to enforce them as the Roman
emperors
were to discover during the great recession between 234 AD. and 284 AD.
when
the economy went tits up. The legions canvassed various junta chiefs
and at the
drop of a hat assassinated the contender for another pretender. No
emperor at
his accession could expect to see his next birthday alive. But the
imperial
administration was built on solid foundations. When the central
government
literally declared bankruptcy in 260 AD. and hat in hand went to the
senate in
Rome and asked for a cash injection, the provinces took matters into
their own
hands, with France taking the lead. From the looks of it the Imperium
Galliarum
was a
seditious province; but the French emperors Postumus, Marius,
Victorinus and
Tetricus seemed to have considered themselves as custodians of the
fragmenting
empire with a mandate on borrowed time. A senate of French nobles
enacted
business during the absence of magistrates appointed by Rome. The
circumstances
when Emperor Aurelian – a good man – restored the authority of the
central
government are rather curious. The armies faced each other at
Chalôn, but
Tetricus and his son handed themselves over to Aurelian and ended their
lives
in peaceful retirement. France rejoined the empire; the French nobles
were
accredited in their assumed positions. Partly this was the work of a
mysterious
woman, Victorina, the “Mother of the Camps,” who traveled between the
rebellious armies and negotiated terms with a strangely unchallenged
authority.
The imperial mint commemorated her on the coinage. Down the line,
however,
these events could only foment the move to greater autonomy of the
provinces.
Of course there were also
genuine invasions, the most
notable by Attila the Hun. Not unlike the modern tabloids, our sources
revel in
the description of a seemingly desperate situation where the Roman
border
defenses were continually overwhelmed by “barbarians” who covered the
earth
like locusts. But even in the case of the undoubted mass migration of
Attila’s
confederacy of nomadic horsemen, one is left to wonder. Azimus or
Azimuntium, a
small town in Thrace on the Illyrian border (to modern Bulgaria),
decided to
ignore the decrees from the Capital. Instead of surrendering hostages
and
handing over treasure to the Hunnic raiders, the burgers of Azimuntium
sallied
out of the less than impressive fortifications and raided the Hunnic
camps with
impunity; even captured hostages, negotiated prisoner exchanges and
then
executed the Hunnic POWs without holding their end of the bargain. And
Attila,
the mighty Attila, the scourge of God, poor thing, was powerless. His
emissaries came whining to the imperial court, but Constantinople
admitted that
it had no control over the Azimuntians. This was getting bad, the great
chieftain was losing face, something he couldn’t afford. Did he call
together
his confederates and came to wipe out Azimuntium? This town was an
ordinary
provincial magistracy with no armed forces stationed in the vicinity;
it
depended entirely on the local constabulary and on emergency levis from
the
able-bodied citizenry. No match for the Huns, one should think. Think
again!
Attila meekly offered a parley and more hostages as a guarantee for the
safe
conduct of the Azimuntian plenipotentiaries. The negotiation got him
nowhere
and his latest hostages, too, ended up impaled on pikes. So Attila
turned his
attention westward and invaded Italy and France. After initial success
he was
ultimately defeated by a confederacy of very nervous militias. Only
days before
the battle they had been recruited on short notice by a professional
general
who arrived with little more than a handful of guards in his train.
There were
last minute desertions in the Roman ranks, but it didn’t make any
difference
for the outcome.
This military inability
among tribal migrants should not be
taken as a sign for a primitive and unsophisticated way of life; far
from it.
It rather seemed the symptom for the natural hesitance of cultured
civilians to
get embroiled in barroom fights. The degree of literacy on a Gothic
wagon train
was above the average of the territories the tribe was visiting, and in
the
beginning, these territories were in Greece, no less. This is not as
surprising
as it sounds. The most extraordinary epigraphic collection under the
Romans are
the Safaitic graffiti in southwest Syria and the north of Jordan. They
cover
the period from the 1st to the 4th century AD.; 12,000 rock cut
graffiti, more
than there have been found at Pompeii. Apparently the inscriptions had
been the
work of a nomadic (sic!) population. There are so
many of
these inscriptions, it raises intriguing questions about ancient
literacy in
general.
The Goths, too, knew how
to communicate their thoughts in
writing. Of all nations they were the first to read the Christian Bible
translated into their own national language. Bishop Wulfila (311 – 383 AD.) had translated the Bible
even
before Jerome finished work on the Vulgate. This Wulfila belonged to
the Gothic
clergy; the Goths, like many of the migrating tribes, were Christians,
and
their spiritual leaders doubled as the Goths’s diplomatic corps,
exploiting
every duplicitous trick in the book. In fact, it seems, they wrote this
book.
But this was not the only factor the Goths could turn to their
advantage. Ammian
informs us, that the Goths “were greatly encouraged by the multitude
that
came daily into their camp to join them: runaway slaves and many others
who
were suffering from severe poverty; a not inconsiderable number, of
whom many
were skilled in the arts and trades, but unable to endure the heavy
burden of
their taxes“
(Ammianus XXXI, 7:3-6). The lower classes
welcomed the
Goths as liberators from their misery, but for the imperial
administration this
was just business as usual. “The regime,” noted the Greek
historian Zosimus, “did not
attend to the sufferings of Macedon and Thessaly, but sent their tax
collectors
as if nothing had happened. Whatever had been spared by the humanity of
the
Barbarians was seized, even the ornaments of the women, and their
clothes,
reducing them almost to nakedness. Every town was therefore filled with
tears
and complaints,” – and
now listen to this – everybody calling out for the Barbarians,
and
desiring their assistance.” We catch a glimpse on
the true nature of what the text
books use to present entirely as a tribal migration, also known as the “Wandering
of the Nations.” Once
we run the numbers one must realize that these migrants were just the
leaven in
the dough, a mere catalyst, the fuse that ignited already existing
social
unrest. This was a revolution of the lower classes, taking up arms
against the
atrocious fiscal practices of the Roman revenue. But there is more.
The following is the most
astonishing piece of evidence I’ve
ever read: “And now the people of the Alemanni, belonging to the
district of
Lintz on the border to Tyrol, violated their longstanding treaty with
the
empire, and this calamity came about like this: A young soldier from
this
nation who served in the imperial guards, returned home on furlough;
and being
a chatty person, he told them that Emperor Valens had sent for his
nephew in
France to assist his campaign in the East. The people of Lintz pricked
their
ears at this intelligence and covertly assembled in bands, and when the
Rhine
was frozen over they raided the border to France in the month of
February. The
French territorial defenses repulsed them,
but not without considerable loss” (Ammianus).
Does the man actually
know what he is telling us?
For starters, the soldier
is a foreign national. This was
common practice. The Romans habitually accepted regular enlistments
from hostile
nations across the border, even encouraged it. So his commanding
officer has no
qualms of sending the young man on holiday, which excludes the
possibility that
the man was a hostage – the Roman equivalent of a student exchange
program. In
other words, the soldier was a volunteer who had enlisted in the Roman
army. As
a regular he had received basic training and now rose through the
ranks. One
day he may even occupy a top rank in the system. He was trusted as a
potential
emissary for the Roman way of life. It seemed never to occur to anybody
in
charge that this man was privy to classified information that should
never cross
the border. So not surprising, the most common and least understood
feature in
those years was the superior intelligence of Rome’s enemies. They
seemed to
anticipate every move before a Roman commander even thought of it. The
raiding
parties knew exactly where to go and when to strike. They had first
hand
intelligence, not from some top ranking traitor, but from the regular
soldier who
is having a holiday and doesn’t do anything wrong. It took the Romans
some time
to appreciate the necessity for counterintelligence. Marshall Stilicho was the first to
filter
false information to the enemy abroad. This communication with the
enemy, prompted
the domestic opposition to accuse the marshall of high treason.
Stilicho paid
for it with his reputation and his life.
Since Emperor Constantine
the number of Germanic regulars in
the ranks was beginning to snowball. By the time of Julian the Apostate
virtually 90% of the top ranking officers were foreign nationals. The
peasants
working the land were kinsmen from the families of POWs. Vandal farmers
turned their
plots to a Garden of Eden and it became Spanish Andalusia. The text
books tell
us of the “barbarization” of the Empire in its last stages, but long
before it
came to this, from the top brass and the magistrates in the centers of
commerce
down to the peasant, “barbarians,” were effectively running the empire;
people
of a foreign origin who nevertheless thought of themselves as Romans.
© - 31/1/2009 - by
michael sympson, 3,600 words, all rights
reserved